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THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF SECURITIES FRAUD:
SECTION 29(A) AND THE NON-RELIANCE CLAUSE
DAVID K. LUTZ*
INTRODUCTION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act"
or "Exchange Act"), and Rule 10b-5 1 promulgated thereunder, pro-
hibit the use of manipulative and deceptive devices in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities. Rule lOb-5 primarily applies to
three broad categories of fraud: (1) misrepresentations or omissions
in corporate disclosure documents; (2) insider trading; and (3) ma-
nipulation.2 Although manipulation may be a factor in persuading a
party to sign a contract, the applicability of Rule 10b-5 to contracts
for the sale or exchange of stock is premised on claims of misrepre-
sentations or omissions in the contract forming the basis of the par-
ties' transaction.3
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2004. I
would like to thank Professor Kevin Haynes, Michael Kasdin, and Ryan Liebl for their helpful
comments and advice throughout the writing of this Note.
1. Section 10(b) makes it:
[U]nlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,. .. [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security..., any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000). Pursuant to this Section, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 which pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly.... (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To en-
gage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
2. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1044 (9th ed.
2003).
3. Although manipulating a party into signing a sales document may be a basis of fraud
liability, Section 29(a) only addresses the effect of contractually agreeing to waive compliance
with provisions of the Act, not whether the party was fraudulently induced into signing the
contract. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) ("Section
29(a) is concerned, not with whether brokers maneuver[ed customers] into an agreement, but
with whether the agreement weaken[s] their ability to recover under the [Exchange] Act."
(alterations in original) (internal quotations marks omitted)).
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The Act's anti-fraud provisions may be avoided, however, if the
parties include a clause specifying that the purchasing party is relying
solely on representations contained in the final written contract,
thereby eliminating the possibility that an aggrieved party may plau-
sibly claim reliance on any oral or written representations that are
excluded from the final contract. This clause may take a number of
different forms, but the substance and effect of the clause will be sub-
stantially similar4
However, the use of an integration or non-reliance clause
("NRC") to preclude reasonable reliance produces tension between
the parties' ability to freely contract and the policy underlying the
Act's anti-waiver provisions.' Section 29(a) provides that "[a]ny con-
dition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder... shall be void."'6 To determine whether standard
clauses, such as a non-reliance clause or an integration clause, violate
Section 29(a), a court must determine whether the operation of the
clause produces a wavier of compliance or whether the clause merely
limits and defines the boundaries of the parties' transaction.7
The use of NRCs to limit fraud liability in the purchase and sale
of securities is a widespread practice. Over the years, courts have
taken different approaches to interpreting the effect of such clauses,8
4. For example, the clause may be an integration clause, providing that all of the parties'
earlier dealings and written agreements are integrated into the final agreement. Additionally,
the clause may be a non-reliance clause, providing that the parties may not rely on any repre-
sentations not contained in the final written agreement. The effect of both clauses is substan-
tially similar because both preclude a party from relying on prior agreements or negotiations
that did not find their way into the final written contract. Some courts, however, have noted that
an integration clause is less explicit in reference to reliance, and therefore may have less eviden-
tiary value than a non-reliance clause to prove the lack of reliance. See In re DaimlerChrysler
AG Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 616, 623 (D. Del. 2003).
5. As Professor Robert Prentice puts it,
on the one hand, it seems unfair to put sellers in the potentially untenable position of
telling the truth in writing but then being subjected to litigation anyway by a buyer who
falsely claims that he was orally lied to. On the other hand, its seems to me (although
apparently not to Judges Posner and Easterbrook) equally unfair to allow sellers to lie
orally and then to hide behind written provisions that they know full well the buyers
are unlikely to read or to understand if they do read.
Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 347-48 (2003) (emphasis in original).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2000).
7. See Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1996).
8. Compare Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966) (holding that an NRC
precludes reasonable reliance as a matter of law), with Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 343 (holding
that an NRC weakens a party's ability to recover for fraud, but such a weakening does not
violate Section 29(a)).
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and the extent to which a selling party may limit liability by requiring
the purchaser to rely solely on representations contained in the final
written agreement, thereby precluding a finding of "reasonable reli-
ance" on any representations made during the course of the negotia-
tions or sale.9
Recently, in AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co.,1° the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed whether the inclusion of an
NRC in a stock purchase agreement precludes a finding of reasonable
reliance as a matter of law." The court found that Section 29(a) is
violated by holding that a party can completely avoid Section 10(b)
fraud liability by simply including an NRC in the final written agree-
ment.12 The Third Circuit thereby created a circuit spilt.13 Other cir-
cuits have concluded that an NRC is an enforceable contractual
provision that ensures the parties' dealings, and any subsequent litiga-
tion, proceed on the basis of a common understanding embodied in
the final written agreement, thus promoting efficiency in contractual
dealings.14
Although the practical issue of inserting an NRC into an agree-
ment is fairly straightforward, the use of an NRC raises questions
regarding the proper function of securities regulation and challenges
the assumptions by which legal interpretation is performed. The cir-
cuit split, therefore, not only represents a split of judicial interpreta-
tion, but also stands for a much more fundamental and widespread
problem. What assumptions should drive legal analysis and rulemak-
ing? What values are served by regulating the securities industry?
This Note will argue that enforcing an NRC to preclude reason-
able reliance as a matter of law, based on a contract negotiated at
9. Compare AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding,
as a matter of law, that an NRC precludes reasonable reliance on representations made outside
of the final agreement), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 805 (2003), with Citibank, N.A. v. Itochu Int'l
Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6007, 2003 WL 179784, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003) (precluding the plaintiff
from claiming reasonable reliance on representations outside of the final written agreement).
10. AES Corp., 325 F.3d 174.
11. Id. at 176.
12. Id. at 180-81.
13. Compare Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 343 (holding that the use of an NRC to preclude
reasonable reliance as a matter of law does not violate Section 29(a)), with AES Corp., 325 F.3d
at 180-81. The extent of the circuit split may be disputed, however, because most courts that
interpret NRCs do not interpret the clauses under Section 29(a). For example, the Seventh
Circuit, D.C. Circuit, and the First Circuit have concluded that NRCs are enforceable contrac-
tual provisions, but did not interpret the clauses under Section 29(a). These courts, however,
interpret the issue in such a way as to eliminate the need to address Section 29(a). See infra Part
III.D.
14. See Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 2000).
2004]
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arm's length between sophisticated parties, does not violate Section
29(a)." Following such a rule allows for the advancement of congres-
sional goals-including investor protection-and reduces the occur-
rences of fraud that many critics seek to prevent. Advancing the goals
of investor protection does not require the abandonment of law and
economics or legal rules. While many critics argue that an NRC is
simply a mechanism that allows parties to get away with fraud, the
NRC is a valuable tool that will reduce fraud by forcing parties to
insist on a complete and efficient contract. In this regard, adopting a
rule that enforces NRCs against sophisticated parties addresses the
concerns of critics who argue against more radical and far-reaching
proposals to reform securities regulation. 6
This Note will not address arguments relating to the enforcement
of NRCs against unsophisticated individual investors.,7 While much of
the analysis that follows can be applied to such investors, the scope of
this Note is limited to the evaluation of Section 29(a) and the NRC
within the specific context of a negotiated agreement between sophis-
ticated parties. Many critics extend their analysis to include both so-
phisticated and unsophisticated investors, 18 but the purpose of what
follows is to simply address one portion of a very complex problem.
15. This Note primarily focuses on the issues of interpreting Section 29(a) in conjunction
with an NRC. While using the recent decision of AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174,
to put the argument in context, I do not undertake to offer an in-depth analysis of the cases, and
the factual issues of such cases, forming the circuit split. The theoretical issues and policy con-
cerns addressed throughout this Note, however, are all directly applicable to the circuit split and
the Third Circuit's decision, and an overview of the issues in the cases will aid in the understand-
ing of the arguments that follow.
16. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88
CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000) (advocating for securities industry regulations that classify investors
into categories); Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of
Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 528-32 (1999) (pro-
viding an overview of deregulation proposals).
17. Likewise, this Note will not directly address transactions between "sophisticated"
investors (who are not corporate entities but are merely more experienced or wealthy investors)
and their brokers. Such investment transactions do not directly implicate Section 29(a) or the
NRC (but may depending on the contractualization of the sale and the specific clauses con-
tained therein), but rather involve a discussion concerning the broker's accurate disclosure of
risk and why sophisticated investors will tend to make more risky investment decisions. Section
29(a) is not applicable to fraudulent misrepresentations by brokers to induce customers into
buying securities. See supra note 3. I seek to focus on negotiated contracts between sophisti-
cated parties, not on the relationship between a sophisticated party and its broker. For a good
discussion on the broker-sophisticated investor relationship, see Donald C. Langevoort, Selling
Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons For Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers
and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 5, at 378.
Because I realize that sophisticated investors tend to have the same behavioral and
cognitive vulnerabilities as unsophisticated investors, I am concerned with the contrac-
tualization of securities fraud jurisprudence even in cases involving corporate entities.
[Vol179:803
THE LA W AND ECONOMICS OF SECURITIES FRA UD
Part I of this Note will evaluate the issue of reasonable reliance
under Rule 10b-5 generally, and move on to an analysis of reasonable
reliance specifically in the context of Section 29(a) when the contract
contains an NRC. Part II will present the two major theories driving
the interpretation of securities regulation-law and economics and
behavioralism-and evaluate the behavioralists' attempt to under-
mine two fundamental assumptions of the law and economics move-
ment-rationality and the preference for rules over standards. Part II
will also offer an analysis of legal rulemaking and conclude that pre-
cise rules operate to reduce transaction costs and increase efficiency.
In conclusion, Part III will argue that Section 29(a) is not violated by
finding, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff cannot claim reasonable
reliance on representations not included in the final agreement when
the contract contains an NRC. Such a finding provides a precise rule
for contracting parties to adhere to, which thereby reduces transac-
tion costs, reduces fraud, and provides for efficient outcomes.
I. THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 29(A)
Section 29(a) of the Act is a provision directly addressing the en-
forceability of contractual clauses that seek to waive compliance with
or avoid regulation under federal securities laws. 9 The issues involved
in the interpretation and application of Section 29(a), therefore, hinge
on whether the contracting parties are attempting to limit or waive
the rights provided by the Act, and consequently the ability to re-
cover for the violation of such rights. The importance of Section 29(a)
in the context of fraud is whether the use of an NRC can preclude the
finding of reasonable reliance as a matter of law. To understand the
importance of such a finding, a brief overview of the elements neces-
sary to plead a Section 10(b) fraud claim is appropriate.
A. Pleading Fraud Under Section 10(b)
A successful cause of action for securities fraud under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
Although corporate entities are the contracting parties, the investing decisions are
made by all-too-human beings who may have been misled by oral fraud that I do not
countenance.
Id. Prentice also notes, "even sophisticated investors can be trusting and vulnerable to decep-
tion." Id. at 418.
19. Section 29(a) provides that waivers of compliance shall be void, and Section 29(b)
provides the conditions under which a contract will be void. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2000).
20041
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defendant, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,
knowingly (or recklessly) made a misstatement or omission of mate-
rial fact upon which the plaintiff reasonably (or justifiably) relied, and
this reliance caused the plaintiff's injury.20 A finding of reasonable
reliance requires the plaintiff to exercise the diligence that a reason-
able person would have exercised to protect his own interests.2
The issue of reasonable reliance is primarily disputed in two fac-
tual settings. First, the plaintiff relied on oral or written representa-
tions that are contradicted by the offering memorandum or
prospectus. 22 Second, the plaintiff relied on oral or written misrepre-
sentations (or omissions) that were not included in the final written
agreement, and the contract contained an NRC or an integration
clause. 23 The second factual category exists because contracting par-
ties seek to foreclose a factually specific judicial review of the reason-
ableness of the plaintiff's reliance where the final written contract
contains an NRC. In other words, an NRC is a contractual mecha-
nism seeking to limit the parties' representations to the four corners
of the final contract, precluding an aggrieved party from claiming
reliance on any representations that are not included in that contract.
Two leading cases with respect to a plaintiff's reliance on oral
statements contradicted by a written offering memorandum are Ken-
nedy v. Josephthal & Co. 24 and Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc.25 Both cases
held, as a matter of law, that a Rule 10b-5 cause of action could not
be sustained where the plaintiff claimed reliance on oral representa-
tions contradicted by the final writing. Although the two cases do not
implicate Section 29(a) or an NRC, the court's analysis in both cases
demonstrates the judicial approach to the interpretation of reliance
within the context of a Rule 10b-5 claim.26
In Kennedy, the plaintiffs purchased a limited partnership inter-
est in a venture involved in the business of mining coal.27 The broker,
20. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2000).
21. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc, 540 F.2d 591,597-98 (3d Cir. 1976).
22. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 801 (1st Cir. 1987); Zobrist v.
Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1514 (10th Cir. 1983).
23. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Itochu Int'l Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6007, 2003 WL 1797847, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003); One-O-One Enters., Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1285 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
24. 814 F.2d 798.
25. 708F.2d 1511.
26. Both courts describe the issue as "justifiable reliance," which is equivalent to the ele-
ment of reasonable reliance. The courts use the two terms interchangeably.
27. 814 F.2d at 800.
[Vol 79:803
THE LA W AND ECONOMICS OF SECURITIES FRA UD
the defendant in the action, told the plaintiffs that the investment was
safe and the partnership would be profitable despite the low price for
coal. The offering memorandum, however, disclosed that the invest-
ment involved a high degree of risk and that the mining operations
would be unprofitable because of the then low price of coal. The
plaintiffs signed documents stating that they read the offering memo-
randum and appreciated the risks involved.
In upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, the First Circuit held that
[j]ustifiable reliance may be decided as a matter of law and we can
think of no facts as egregious as these that would not fully support
such a ruling. When they closed their eyes and passively accepted
the contradictions between [the defendant's] statements and the of-
fering memorandum, appellants could not be said to have justifia-
bly relied on the misrepresentations. 28
In Zobrist, another case involving a coal partnership, the Tenth
Circuit held that knowledge of statements contained in the offering
memorandum are imputed, as a matter of law, to investors who do
not read the documents. 9 Although the defendant broker told the
plaintiffs the investment was a "sure thing," the first page of the
memorandum, along with the risk section, disclosed the investment's
high risk.30 After imputing knowledge of the statements to the plain-
tiffs, the court held that justifiable reliance could not be established as
a matter of law.31
Courts do not, however, articulate a clear rule to determine justi-
fiable reliance as a matter of law. A number of factors are used to
examine whether a plaintiff's reliance on misrepresentations is justi-
fied, including: (1) the sophistication of the plaintiff; (2) the existence
of a long-standing personal or business relationship; (3) access to
relevant information; (4) concealment of the fraud; (5) the existence
of a fiduciary relationship; (6) the opportunity to detect fraud; (7)
whether the plaintiff initiated the stock transaction; and (8) the gen-
erality or specificity of the misrepresentations.3 2 With no single factor
being determinative, the court must balance all factors to determine
whether a plaintiff's reliance was justified.
3
28. Id. at 805.
29. 708 F.2d at 1518.
30. Id. at 1514.
31. Id. at 1518.
32. Kennedy, 814 F.2d at 804.
33. Id.
20041
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Courts adopt a standard-based approach to a determination of
reasonable reliance, balancing eight factors to determine whether the
issue can be decided as a matter of law.34 The absence of a clear rule
produces uncertainty in contractual dealings and forces the parties to
encounter litigation on the other end of the deal. The standard-based
balancing approach employed by the courts increases the costs im-
posed on contracting parties by requiring an ex ante balancing and
individual determination of the factors listed above. As will be argued
throughout this Note, the resulting uncertainty produces high transac-
tion costs and inefficient outcomes.
To counteract the high transaction costs associated with ex ante
balancing, many parties opt to include a contractual device that limits
the buyer's ability to claim reliance on any representations not in-
cluded in the final written agreement. Such a device forecloses the
need for balancing, because the party contractually agrees that it is
only entitled to rely on a specifically identified set of representations.
The NRC thereby lowers the transaction costs associated with the
uncertain balancing necessary for the courts' standard-based ap-
proach, and determines, by agreement, the rule governing the judicial
interpretation of the contract.
B. The Judicial Interpretation of the Non-Reliance Clause
The judicial interpretation of an NRC requires courts to deter-
mine two primary issues. First, the court must determine if the inclu-
sion of an NRC violates Section 29(a) by limiting or weakening the
parties' ability to recover under the Exchange Act. Second, the court
must determine whether an NRC establishes a clear rule of non-
reliance, or whether such a clause is merely an additional factor to
consider in the standard-based balancing approach employed by
courts when the contract does not include an NRC.
In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,3 the Supreme
Court noted that "Section 29(a) is concerned, not with whether bro-
kers maneuver[ed customers] into an agreement, but with whether
the agreement weakens their ability to recover under the [Exchange]
Act."36 Therefore, as the Court correctly notes, the scope of Section
29(a) is limited to a contractual provision purporting to waive a
34. Id.
35. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
36. Id. at 230 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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party's rights under the Act, not whether the seller induced a party to
purchase through fraud or misrepresentations.37 An NRC, therefore,
does not seek to eliminate the ability of an aggrieved buyer to bring a
fraud action, it only seeks to require that the party base such a fraud
action on representations made in the final written agreement.
The circuits, however, split on the proper interpretation of Sec-
tion 29(a) and, specifically, on whether Section 29(a) is violated if the
use of an NRC is held to preclude a finding of reasonable reliance as
a matter of law, thereby defeating a securities fraud claim based on
any misstatement other than those contained in the final agreement.38
The effect of such a provision is to eliminate the ability of a plaintiff
to plead reasonable reliance on any facts, omissions, or misrepresen-
tations that are not included in the final written agreement. This ef-
fect leads some courts to hold that such a preclusion is a "waiver"
within the meaning of Section 29(a) and is therefore void.39
In 1966, in Rogen v. Ilikon Corp. ,40 the First Circuit found no ma-
terial difference between a clause stating, for example, that "the party
waives any rights based on the misrepresentations of the seller," and a
clause stating, "the purchaser is not relying on the seller's representa-
tions."'" The court warned that "[w]ere we to hold that the existence
of [the clause] constituted the basis (or a substantial part of the basis)
for finding non-reliance as a matter of law, we would have gone far
toward eviscerating Section 29(a). ' '41
The clause in Rogen, however, is far from the typical NRC found
in a contemporary stock purchase agreement. The contract at issue
there did not include any representations in the final agreement and
disclaimed any obligation to make full disclosure.43 A typical NRC, on
the other hand, merely confines reliance on any representations made
during the course of negotiations to the four corners of the contract.
Such a clause in no way disclaims an obligation regarding disclosure,
37. Id. at 230-31.
38. See AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2003) ("It would offend
Section 29(a) to bar its claim based solely on a contractual commitment not to claim reliance."),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 805 (2003).
39. Id. at 180.
40. 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966).
41. Id. at 268.
42. Id.
43. Specifically, the plaintiffs "acknowledged that they are fully familiar with the business
and prospects of the corporation, are not relying on any representations or obligations to make
full disclosure with respect thereto, and have made such investigation thereof as they deem
necessary." Id. at 265 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and affirmatively states the representations that form the basis for the
parties' transaction. Rogen, therefore, is unpersuasive when arguing
that a contract containing an NRC similarly waives a party's rights
and obligations under the Act.
Thirty years later, in Harsco Corp. v. Segui,44 the Second Circuit
addressed an NRC that "outline[d], with great specificity, the repre-
sentations and warranties that [the plaintiff] agreed to rely upon-
and not rely upon-in purchasing all of [the defendant's] outstanding
stock. '45 The clause at issue in Harsco is a more typical use of an NRC
than the contract addressed in Rogen, because the Harsco contract
contained specific representations on which the buyer was entitled to
rely while not disclaiming disclosure obligations, 46 while the Rogen
contract disclaimed any obligation to disclose and contained no rep-
resentations on which the purchaser was entitled to rely.
47
The Harsco court agreed that an NRC weakens a party's ability
to recover for fraud, but held that "such a 'weakening' does not con-
stitute a forbidden waiver of compliance. ' 48 In support of its holding,
the court recognized the sophistication of the investors, the time and
intensity of the negotiations, and the fact the both parties were repre-
sented by counsel.4 9 The court observed that "[h]ere there is a de-
tailed writing developed via negotiations among sophisticated
business entities and their advisors. That writing, we conclude, defines
the boundaries of the transaction. Harsco brings this suit principally
alleging conduct that falls outside those boundaries."50 In so holding,
the court distinguished the contract at issue in Rogen by observing
that there, the contract did not contain a provision similar to an NRC,
and was formed amid a disparity of bargaining power that allowed the
purchaser to be "duped" into forfeiting his rights., The court prop-
erly characterized the contract and the NRC by finding that, "[u]nlike
a contractual provision which prohibits a party from suing at all, the
contract here reflects in detail the reasons why [the plaintiff] bought
44. 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996).
45. Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id.
47. Rogen, 361 F.2d at 265; see also supra note 43.
48. Harsco, 91 F.3d at 343.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 344.
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[defendant's company] -in essence, [plaintiff] bought the representa-
tions and... nothing else.
'5 2
In One-O-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso,53 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals weighed in on the effect of NRCs in
federal securities fraud actions. Then-Judge Ginsburg, writing for the
court, held that:
Were we to permit plaintiffs' use of the defendants' prior represen-
tations (and defendants' nondisclosure of negotiations inconsistent
with those representations) to defeat the clear words and purpose
of the Final Agreement's integration clause, contracts would not be
worth the paper on which they are written. On a matter of such
large significance to the parties' bargain, silence in a final agree-
ment containing an integration clause-in the face of prior explicit
representations-must be deemed an abandonment or excision of
those earlier representations.5 4
Although the court's reasoning was sound, a key deficiency in
the opinion was the failure to interpret, or even mention, Section
29(a). Although it was interpreting the fraud claim under Section
10(b), the court did not discuss the extent to which the clause at issue
weakened or waived the plaintiff's ability to recover under the Act.
Section 29(a) was relevant to the court's analysis because the contract
at issue contained an NRC, and therefore contractually limited the
representations on which the plaintiff was entitled to rely. The court's
reasoning, however, is consistent with the holdings of other courts
that preclude reliance because of the inclusion of an NRC.
The First Circuit revisited the issue in Jackvony v. RIHT Finan-
cial Corp.15 It diverged from its reasoning in Rogen and followed the
holding of Harsco, holding that the plaintiff could not establish rea-
sonable reliance when the alleged misrepresentations were not con-
tained in the final written agreement.5 6 In rejecting the plaintiff's
contention of reasonable reliance based on representations made
prior to, but not included in, the final written agreement, the court,
speaking through now-Justice Breyer held that "his argument fails in
light of the later written contract, with its explicit statement that it
contains the parties' entire bargain."57
52. Id.
53. 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
54. Id. at 1287 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
55. 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989).
56. Id. at 417.
57. Id. at 416.
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In Rissman v. Rissman,58 the Seventh Circuit articulated a clear
rationale, founded in the proper interpretation of securities law gen-
erally, for precluding a party from claiming reliance on representa-
tions not contained in the final written agreement. 9 In an opinion
written by Judge Easterbrook, the court held that:
Securities law does not permit a party to a stock transaction to dis-
avow [non-reliance clauses]-to say, in effect, "I lied when I told
you I wasn't relying on your prior statements" and then to seek
damages for their contents. Stock transactions would be impossibly
uncertain if federal law precluded parties from agreeing to rely on
the written word alone. Without such a principle, sellers would
have no protection against plausible liars and gullible jurors.
6
0
Although, like other circuits, the court failed to mention Section
29(a), it specifically identified the proper function of an NRC and, as
this Note will argue more fully below, the reason why such clauses
must be enforced: "A non-reliance clause.., ensures that both the
transaction and any subsequent litigation proceed on the basis of the
parties' writings, which are less subject to the vagaries of memory and
the risks of fabrication."
61
C. AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co.
By the time the Third Circuit ruled on the use of NRCs, the
question seemed well settled in the other federal circuits. The consen-
sus was that an NRC provides for a mutual understanding regarding
the boundaries of the transaction and the specific representations on
which the parties are entitled to rely. The Third Circuit, however, was
unimpressed by the reasoning of its sister circuits, and held that Sec-
tion 29(a) is violated by an NRC that precludes a plaintiff from show-
ing reasonable reliance on representations outside the agreement as a
matter of law.
62
The plaintiff in AES alleged that the defendant artificially in-
flated the stock price of the target company by misrepresenting the
completion date and future profitability of a power plant being built
abroad. 63 The documents underlying the transaction, however, con-
58. 213 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2000).
59. Id. at 383.
60. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. at 384.
62. AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
805 (2003).
63. Id. at 176.
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tained no representations concerning the estimated completion date
or the potential future profitability of this specific plant.64 The final
written contract, as well as the confidentiality agreement signed be-
fore the commencement of negotiations and the offering memoran-
dum, contained an NRC providing that the plaintiff was entitled to
rely solely on the representations specifically identified in the agree-
ment.65
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, finding that "Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act does not
bar the enforcement of a clause disclaiming representations and war-
ranties not appearing in a final agreement negotiated between sophis-
ticated parties in an arm's length transaction. '66 The court relied on
Harsco, and the fact that the plaintiff was a sophisticated buyer who
was not in an inferior or unfair position in relation to the seller, to
reach its conclusion.67
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's holding,
and found "the conclusion inescapable that enforcement of the non-
reliance clauses to bar [the plaintiff's] fraud claims as a matter of law
would be inconsistent with Section 29(a). 68 The court held that such
a provision is an anticipatory waiver of any claim based on the
fraudulent misrepresentations of the party, and therefore, is a waiver
prohibited by Section 29(a).69 The court followed the First Circuit's
reasoning in Rogen, which the Second Circuit had rejected in Harsco,
and failed to distinguish the important factual differences between
the cases.70 In effect, the AES court transformed the NRC from a
mechanism precluding reasonable reliance to another factor in an
already complex balancing test. Although the court provided no per-
suasive justification for why an NRC operates to waive compliance
with the provisions of the Act, and exactly why Section 29(a) is vio-
lated, the decision casts doubt on the continued viability and useful-
ness of the NRC.71
64. Id. at 177.
65. Id. at 176-77.
66. AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 157 F. Supp. 2d 346, 353-54 (D. Del. 2001).
67. Id.
68. AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 180.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The Third Circuit did, however, give evidentiary value to the NRC in the multi-factor




The divergent judicial interpretation of Ruie 10b-5 cases, based
on whether a contractual mechanism precludes reliance, displays
courts' infidelity to the underlying principles of securities regulation
and fraud actions. Why does a contractual device seeking to enforce
the very same holding the court will ultimately reach change the va-
lidity of the clause? An NRC simply seeks to contractually enforce
the same decisions courts reach time and time again-that a plaintiff
cannot rely on oral statements contradicted by the final writing. The
sole difference between the two lines of cases is that an NRC is a con-
tractual instrument that implicates Section 29(a), where cases that
contain no NRC do not. Most courts, until AES, simply ignored Sec-
tion 29(a) and followed the Kennedy-Zobrist reasoning, even when
the contract contained an NRC or integration clause. These cases, at
least impliedly, demonstrate that a plaintiff does not have a right to
rely on prior oral representations and a clause explicitly stating such
does not waive a right, because such a right does not exist.
7 2
Before a full discussion of this fundamental problem can take
place, however, the nature and purpose of securities regulation must
be fully explored. Courts' recent tendencies to side with the plaintiff
in the summary judgment phase of the case demonstrates a subtle
shift in the views of why Congress decided to regulate securities in the
first place. Does securities regulation promote efficiency in capital
markets, serve the community, or protect the investor? Does regula-
tion serve all of these goals, some, or none?
II. THE FUNCTION OF SECURITIES REGULATION
The interpretation of securities law must begin from an under-
standing of why the securities industry is regulated in the first place.
Securities law is seen as a field of public law that orders and regulates
the private contracting behavior of individual investors.73 The recogni-
tion of this principle explains, in part, the conflicting views regarding
72. See Citibank, N.A. v. Itochu Int'l Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6007, 2003 WL 1797847, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003) ("This Court... will hold plaintiffs to the agreement to which they
bargained. Plaintiffs' securities fraud.., claims cannot be based upon representations outside of
the Agreement."). Later in the same case, the court addressed an indemnification provision that
prohibited the plaintiff from suing at all. In interpreting this provision, the court noted, "[s]uch a
broad-sweeping waiver clause is exactly the type of contractual provision that [Section 29(a)]
and the case law forbid." Id. at *3.
73. See Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation of the Securities Market, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 814 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) ("The litera-
ture on securities regulation is diffuse and unfocused because securities regulation is understood
as a field of public law that cuts across every aspect of the securities industry.").
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the proper function of securities regulation. On one hand, law and
economics scholars argue that securities regulation is designed to
promote the freedom of contract, and thereby allow investors to ra-
tionally maximize their own utility by freely bargaining for economic
benefit.7 4 Others argue that regulation is aimed at "fairness, equity,
the protection of investors, the need for public confidence in capital
markets, and the deterrence of fraud."75 Behavioralists point to the
limits of human cognition and judgment to refute the ideal of perfect
rationality, and argue that individual action is predictably irrational,
and that legal rules should be shaped around observations of human
behavior.
76
The conflict between contractual efficiency and the paternalist
pursuit of social welfare is exemplified by the anti-waiver provisions
of Section 29(a). This section will provide a brief overview of two
different theories of human behavior and legal interpretation-law
and economics and behavioralism-and discuss how these theories
apply to an analysis of securities regulation and the application of
legal rules.
A. The Law and Economics Perspective
The law and economics perspective on legal analysis uses ex-
planatory and descriptive models, based on economic principles, to
account for human activity and the actions and decisions of legal bod-
ies.77 The basic agent in law and economics analysis is homo
economicus-a rational, competitive, self-interested actor seeking to
maximize individual utility.78 The basic criterion for assessing the ac-
tions of the individual, and the rules developed and implemented by
legal actors, is efficiency.79 The analysis of legal rules, public agencies,
and individuals, therefore, is couched in terms of economic, as op-
posed to social, principles.
The law and economics perspective is derived, in part, from the
most basic underpinnings of contract law. The law of contracts is
74. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 761
(1975) ("The basis of an economic approach to law is the assumption that the people involved
with the legal system act as rational maximizers of their satisfactions.").
75. Welle, supra note 16, at 521.
76. See Prentice, supra note 5, at 358-421.
77. See Denis J. Brion, Norms and Values in Law and Economics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 73, at 1042-44.
78. Id. at 1042.
79. Id. at 1043.
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based "on a model consisting of two alert individuals, mindful of their
self-interest, hammering out an agreement by a process of hard bar-
gaining."80 Law and economics supplements this traditional notion of
contracting behavior by recognizing that individuals are not only
"mindful of their self-interest," but are seeking to maximize their
utility, and are not only "alert," but they are also rational. 8" The pri-
mary objective of a written contract is not only to provide and explain
the essential terms of the bargain, but also to create a legally enforce-
able instrument exposing both parties to potential legal sanctions for
failing to uphold the negotiated agreement.82 Law and economics as-
sumes that, because of such risk exposure, contracting parties will
negotiate for the terms that most closely align with their self-interest,
while remaining mindful of the potential consequences of opportunis-
tically taking advantage of the other party.83
From this perspective, contracting behavior is purely economic.
A and B desire to engage in a transaction that is mutually beneficial.
Although the two parties will both benefit from the bargain, their
interests in the details of the transaction will inevitably conflict, lead-
ing to negotiations detailing the allocation of benefits and risks within
the agreement to the respective parties. The information available to
the parties during the course of the negotiations is imperfect, and the
cost of gaining perfect knowledge will often lead to inefficient out-
comes because the transaction costs of pursuing perfect knowledge
will outweigh the benefits derived from achieving it. Contracts, there-
fore, are potentially inefficient instruments with gaps resulting from
the parties' failure to foresee or predict every possible circumstance
under which the contract will or will not be performed. The only solu-
tion is to create and enforce efficient legal rules that assist the parties
80. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACrS 6 (4th ed.
1998).
81. See Brion, supra note 77.
82. Judge Posner identifies five economic functions served by contracts: "(1) to prevent
opportunism, (2) to interpolate efficient terms, (3) to prevent avoidable mistakes in the con-
tracting process, (4) to allocate risk to the superior risk bearer, and (5) to reduce the costs of
resolving contract disputes." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (6th ed.
2003).
83. See Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 410-15
(2002). The rational expectations investors assumes that sophisticated corporate actors are
looking for the opportunity to lie, cheat, and steal, so the investor is cold and calculating when
approaching the transaction. As Professor Stout puts it, "[the rational expectations investor]
assumes that corporate insiders and securities professionals will steal her money if they can do
so, just as she assumes that the other player in a chess game will take her queen if she leaves it
exposed." Id. at 410.
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in properly determining the substantive rights and obligations form-
ing the basis of the agreement and predicting how legal institutions
will interpret these rights and obligations.
Creating legal rules to promote efficient contracting must be
predicated on the rational choices of parties and the enforcement of
these choices. The assumption of perfect rationality enables courts to
interpret claims based on the terms of the contract and enforce the
provisions to which the parties voluntarily consented. An efficient
contract, therefore, embodies a voluntary exchange in which two or
more parties, rationally acting in their self-interest, agree to a specific
distribution of risks, costs, and potential liabilities. The value of a
contract as a commercial instrument depends on the court's willing-
ness to enforce the provisions of the contract as written, enabling ra-
tional parties to determine the costs and benefits of the exchange.
84
The rational choice theory underlying the law and economics
perspective provides an explanation as to why certain voluntary ex-
changes take place while others do not.85 An exchange occurs when
there is a cooperative surplus between the parties-both parties
gained from the exchange with little or no transaction costs.86 If a vol-
untary exchange does not take place, the transaction costs out-
weighed the benefits to one or all of the parties. The key to
promoting efficient voluntary exchanges, therefore, is to limit the
transaction costs that impede an exchange and to correct for those
costs when they are significant. In legal terms, rules should be shaped
to encourage cooperative surpluses while minimizing the transaction
costs associated with voluntary exchanges.
Limiting transaction costs is essential to an efficient exchange. In
the context of securities regulation, Congress mandates a specific al-
84. See, e.g., One-O-One Enters., Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("Were we to permit plaintiffs' use of the defendants' prior representations (and defendants'
nondisclosure of negotiations inconsistent with those representations) to defeat the clear words
and purpose of the Final Agreement's integration clause, contracts would not be worth the
paper on which they were written." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
85. See generally Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 73, at 790.
86. Id. at 803.
Rational choice theory offers no prediction about the particular proportions in which
voluntary traders will divide a cooperative surplus; it merely suggests that if such a co-
operative surplus exists and, very importantly, if there are no serious impediments to
exchange (that is, no transaction costs), traders will find a way to divide that coopera-
tive surplus so that both of them are better off than they would have been if they had
not traded.
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location of transaction costs to promote the existence of cooperative
surpluses, while shifting the costs to the actors best able to bear them.
Mandatory disclosure requirements, for example, impose substantial
transaction costs on publicly traded companies by requiring full and
continuous disclosure of material information. While these costs are
high, shifting the costs associated with gathering material information
to the individual investor would, in most cases, greatly outweigh any
benefit derived from a voluntary exchange. The mandatory disclosure
regime thereby encourages voluntary exchanges by minimizing trans-
action costs and creating cooperative surpluses where all parties will
benefit from the transaction.
Like mandatory disclosure, the broad anti-fraud provisions of the
Act impose transaction costs on actors seeking to buy or sell securi-
ties. For example, if A enters into a stock purchase agreement with B,
and B employs a manipulative or deceptive device in the sale, B's
transaction costs are increased by the exposure to potential liability.
In the same way, the anti-fraud provisions lower A's transaction costs
by providing recovery if the sale is fraudulent. Rule 10b-5, therefore,
encourages efficient voluntary exchanges by reducing the incentive to
deceive and increasing cooperative surpluses by providing protection
from fraud.
The interpretation of contracts largely depends on what moti-
vates rational actors to enter into a contract in the first place. 87 Con-
tract theorists identify three primary motivations to contracting
behavior: transaction cost economizing, risk distribution, and incen-
tive alignment.88 A contract can be an instrument to economize trans-
action costs by reducing ex post costs (such as litigation) and ex ante
costs (such as information gathering). As argued above, the manda-
tory disclosure regime reduces ex ante costs by requiring corporations
to disclose material information to the investing public. Likewise,
engaging in fraudulent activities increases ex post costs by exposing
the party to fraud claims and potential liability. As will be argued
fully below, contractual devices seeking to limit the possibility of liti-
gation are aimed at minimizing ex post transaction costs, thereby
economizing transaction costs and producing efficient outcomes.
87. See Scott E. Masten, Contractual Choice, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 73, at 26.
88. Id.
[Vol 79:803
THE LA W AND ECONOMICS OF SECURITIES FRA UD
Risk distribution contracts are motivated by a desire to shift risk
to the party best able to bear it.89 The most obvious form of risk dis-
tribution is an insurance contract, where one party will compensate
for the loss of another because a superior financial position enables
the party to do so. The motivation of risk distribution is closely
aligned with transaction cost economizing, in that contracting parties
will seek to shift the risk of increased transaction costs resulting from
the contract. Litigation, for example, is a large transaction cost associ-
ated with the performance of a contract. A party seeking to minimize
the possibility that this transaction cost will detract from the benefit
of the bargain can include clauses in the contract that shift potential
risks to the other party. An NRC accomplishes risk distribution by
minimizing the possibility of litigation while transferring the risk of
loss to the party agreeing to rely only on specific representations. The
party making such an agreement should be compensated for accept-
ing such a risk when all the representations the party desires to rely
on are not included in the final agreement.
Incentive alignment contracts are motivated by a desire to en-
gage in a mutually beneficial transaction. 90 Both parties seek to gain
maximum benefit at minimum cost, leading to a negotiated agree-
ment where costs, benefits, risks, and liabilities are allocated so as to
allow each contracting party to realize the benefit of the bargain. In-
centive alignment is a primary motivation for most contracts because
parties enter into agreements to gain a benefit through a relationship
with another party. The three theories of contracting are not mutually
exclusive and multiple motivations will often be present. For exam-
ple, transaction cost economizing and risk distribution motivate the
parties to structure their contract in a way so as to allow for incentive
alignment.
The rational choice theory and the motivations for contracting
are interrelated. Limiting transaction costs and creating cooperative
surpluses is the primary goal of a party entering into a contractual
agreement. A party motivated by a desire to economize transaction
costs, distribute risk, or align incentives will only engage in the trans-
action if a cooperative surplus exists. The ex ante determinations of
contracting parties must be legally enforced ex post, because without
such enforcement the transaction costs associated with contracting,
89. "In pure insurance or risk-transfer transactions, the objective is to shift risk to the less
risk-adverse transactor or 'low-cost risk bearer."' Id. at 26-27.
90. Id. at 27.
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and the inability to distribute and accept risk, will lead to inefficient
outcomes. Efficiency depends on a party's ability to freely and ration-
ally enter contracts by assessing the costs, risks, and benefits derived
from the exchange.
B. The Behavioralist Perspective
Critics of the law and economics movement challenge two fun-
damental assumptions. First, the assumption of perfect rationality
fails to properly describe reality and the law and economics move-
ment's usefulness in shaping legal rules and public policy is under-
mined by failing to account for systemic irrational behavior.91 Second,
law and economics focuses on economically defined individual choice,
and ignores the social costs and objectives of securities regulation.9
Regulation should therefore be more paternalistic and restrict indi-
vidual choices that undermine social goals. 93
1. The Assumption of Rationality
Law and economics employs a model based on the assumption of
perfect rationality to shape legal rules and implement public policy. 94
Since actors will predictably seek to maximize individual utility, legal
rules can be shaped on the assumption that two rational actors will
contract to achieve efficient bargains. Behavioralists, however, chal-
lenge the law and economics assumption of perfect rationality and
argue that individual actors will fall prey to cognitive illusions and
errors in judgment that make assuming rationality inconsistent with
reality.95 Behavioralists point to empirical data demonstrating that
91. See generally Prentice, supra note 5.
92. This argument is based, in part, on the observation that by focusing solely on rationally
maximizing utility, the law and economics approach omits much more than it provides. But, as
Judge Posner points out, "a theory cannot be overturned by pointing out its defects or limita-
tions but only by proposing a more inclusive, more powerful, and above all more useful theory."
Posner, supra note 74, at 774. Law and economics, therefore, does not pretend to be a theory
without limitation, but only as the most useful of several competing theories. While behavioral-
ists are attempting to overtake the law and economics approach to be the more useful legal
theory, the lack of sufficient empirical and theoretical justification for the behavioralist ap-
proach, at least thus far, hinders its ability to provide a high degree of usefulness-at least in the
context of legal rulemaking and promulgation.
93. See infra note 103.
94. See supra Part II.A.
95. Prentice, supra note 5, at 358-78. Prentice asks the question, "[w]hat would lead an
investor who has received and relied upon oral factual representations and/or promises from her
broker or some other seller. .. to sign a contract containing a disclaimer, and/or a merger
clause?" Id. at 358. He then answers the question by outlining eleven sets of behavioral factors
that may influence such a decision: rational ignorance; overoptimism, overconfidence, and the
[Vol 79:803
THE LA W AND ECONOMICS OF SECURITIES FRA UD
individuals systematically deviate from economically defined rational
behavior and will predictably act irrationally when making decisions,
leading behavioralists to conclude that the "behavioral approach is
dramatically more descriptive of reality than the widely-accepted law
and economics approach.
96
Predicting human behavior, and specific reactions to a set of cir-
cumstances, is a powerful tool for legal rulemaking and policy formu-
lation. If behavior can be predicted accurately, legal bodies can
promulgate and interpret potential rules and regulations with an un-
derstanding of the way in which individuals will tend to react. By
definition, however, irrational behavior is very difficult to predict,
leading to a limited usefulness in legal interpretation. Behavioralists
respond, however, that such cognitive illusions affect individuals with
uncanny consistency and therefore are proper criteria to judge and
predict human behavior and instinctual responses in a given situa-
tion.97
Critics argue that behavioralists rely on an incomplete data set,
and "simplify and overgeneralize findings on human cognition and
rationality to make these findings seem simultaneously important and
illusion of control; the inability to accurately calculate the probability of future events; the false
consensus effect and personal positivity bias; the inability to detect deception; insensitivity to
the source of information; over-reliance on oral communications; status quo bias; social proof;
anchoring and adjustment; and anticipated regret. Id.
96. Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Secu-
rities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133, 135 (2000).
97. See Prentice, supra note 5. Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski makes a good argument as to
why this premise is mistaken.
[T]he primary lesson that legal scholars have taken from the cognitive psychology of
judgment and choice, the notion that people make systematically erroneous choices, is
mistaken. At the very least, it has been overlearned and overapplied by legal scholars.
The principle lesson of cognitive psychology is not that people make mistakes. Rather,
the lesson is that people develop complex, contextual strategies for making choices.
They develop rules of thumb and rely on ad hoc perceptions, emotions, accumulated
memory, and loose associations. Although reliance on heuristics creates vulnerabilities
in judgment, people are also highly adaptive decisionmakers. Individuals often learn to
restructure problems so as to avoid, or at least reduce, the difficulties that the limita-
tions of human cognition would otherwise impose. Indeed, some individuals never
adopt the particular cognitive perspective that produces errors in judgment. Further-
more, individuals can delegate decisionmaking to privately employed experts with bet-
ter judgment.
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1165, 1168 (2003). It is exactly this capacity to delegate that undermines much of the behavioral-
ist argument when applied to sophisticated corporate actors. AES, for example, is a large inter-
national corporation employing over 30,000 employees, and presumably has both an in-house
legal department and extensive outside legal representation. Even if a number of these individ-
ual actors fall prey to cognitive errors, the extensive numbers of experts offering counsel to the




simple enough to be incorporated into legal policy." 98 Behavioral re-
search, for example, demonstrates that behavior not only substan-
tially varies from individual to individual but also that individual
behavior is predicated on such social variables as education, training,
and cultural background, and on emotional and cognitive variables
such as the individual's mood at the time the decision is made.99
Therefore, individual behavior is fundamentally unpredictable be-
cause so much depends on the specific individual's background, emo-
tional state, and cognitive capacity. The incredible number of
complex variables affecting a decision at any given moment makes
the task of shaping a legal rule or evaluating a policy based on human
behavior nearly impossible. The only way around such a conclusion is
to point to a limited number of circumstances where the empirical
data supports a specific finding, while ignoring the great weight of
empirical evidence.1°°
The law and economics model of contracting emphasizes the
minimization of transaction costs, efficiently aligning incentives, and
allocating risk. Therefore, if a party possesses the information and
incentive to enter into a voluntary exchange, an efficient contract
should result. The assumption of rationality, however, assumes that
individuals will make good choices, that they are capable of gaining
adequate information, and are in a position to properly assess risks
and costs. Behavioralists argue that individuals consistently make
poor decisions, and legal rules should be shaped so as to protect indi-
viduals from their own choices. Rules governing voluntary exchanges
must therefore account for poor judgment, and the obligation of legal
bodies is premised on a paternalistic restriction of individual choice-
protecting the investor and society from their own stupidity.
2. The Paternalistic Justification for Behavioralism
The behavioralist argument is premised on notions of social obli-
gation. 1°1 The interpretation of securities regulation is therefore prop-
98. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded For Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72 (2002).
99. Id. at 86-87.
100. Id. ("The legal decision theorists' underlying empirical argument ignores, however, a
growing body of empirical research demonstrating that individuals vary widely, and predictably,
in their propensities to act rationally. In other words, this research tells us that cognitive biases
do not affect us all with uncanny consistency." (first emphasis added)).
101. The behavioralist argument is closely linked with other scholars who emphasize the
importance of investor protection. See, e.g., Welle, supra note 16. Yet, behavioralists also recog-
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erly framed as an issue involving social, as opposed to economic,
principles and objectives. 10 2 Legal rules and regulations must there-
fore serve to limit individual choice to protect society from their own
horrible decisions. Specifically, notions of efficiency and rationality
are undermined by the behavioralist observation that individuals will
enter into contracts that are truly not in their best interest, and judi-
cial or regulatory intervention is necessary to restrict individual
choice to achieve fair and utility maximizing bargains.103
Law and economics emphasizes transaction costs in determining
whether contracting parties will enter into an efficient agreement. If
the benefits derived from the contract exceed the costs associated
with the bargain, a cooperative surplus exists, and the parties execute
an efficient agreement. Transaction costs, however, are purely eco-
nize that the social principles calling for the advancement of investor protection are also linked
to efficiency concerns. As Prentice explains,
[p]roviding contractual cover for fraudsters is a particularly questionable notion be-
cause strong enforcement of antifraud provisions (a) has been empirically linked to ef-
ficient equity markets, and (b) develops the norms that are so helpful in promoting
trust which is, in turn, critical to the performance of honest and efficient equity mar-
kets.
Prentice, supra note 5, at 355-56 (footnotes omitted). Scholars who can be deemed "communi-
tarians" or follow "social law and economics" judge rules, standards, and individual decisions
based on underlying social welfare goals. In this way, such an approach is directly linked to the
behavioralist abandonment of rationality to protect the individual investor. Professor Brion
explains this view by noting:
[T]he proper determinant of the use of property is not self-interest of the title-holder
but instead the emergent values of the community in which it is located. In the law of
harms, liability is based on a breach of a duty of care toward the physical and psychic
integrity of others rather than on a failure to exercise economic rationality in pursuing
wealth-increasing personal gain.
Brion, supra note 77, at 1047.
102. Welle, supra note 16, at 534 ("The policies that the securities laws have been said to
promote include such socially-directed objectives as the protection of investors, the elimination
of manipulative and deceptive practices, the promotion of full disclosure, the encouragement of
high ethical standards, and the provision of effective sanctions for violation."). Note, however,
that Professor Welle makes the assertion that "Congress enacted the securities laws to promote
socially-directed values, such as fairness, equity, the protection of investors, the deterrence of
fraud, and the promotion of ethical standards" without recognizing the relationship such values
have to efficiency and economic concerns. Id. at 539. Contra Prentice, supra note 5, at 355-56.
103. This argument is based on the implicit assumption that individuals, even while initially
acting irrationally, cannot adapt to act rationally under similar circumstances in the future. The
irrational decisionmaker is likewise capable of delegating the task to someone without such
vulnerabilities. As Professor Rachlinski explains:
The cognitive psychology of judgment and choice does not, therefore, support aban-
doning individual judgment in every instance in which people rely on a misleading
heuristic. Even heuristically driven individual choice can be trusted far more than legal
scholars have realized, so long as individuals can learn better decisionmaking strategies
or delegate their choices to those who have. Merely linking a cognitive bias in judg-
ment to a decision that law could regulate should not support implementing a con-
straint on individual choice.
Rachlinski, supra note 97, at 1168.
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nomic in nature and disregard other costs that may lead to inefficient
or irrational outcomes. The cognitive errors and misguided judgments
of contracting parties impose a cost and threaten the efficiency of the
contract. Such cognitive costs must be accounted for when analyzing
individual contracting behavior.
Cognitive costs, behavioralists argue, must be accounted for in
legal analysis in order to achieve the social goals underlying securities
regulation. 1°4 Opponents of law and economics argue that private law
is becoming increasingly more conservative, preferring "rules over
standards, certainty over flexibility, law over facts, and individualism
over community."1°S Securities regulations, they argue, "promote spe-
cific values and pressure parties to behave in a selfless fashion." 1°6 In
other words, securities regulation is based on social principles and is
aimed at protecting the individual investor from sophisticated corpo-
rate actors that will, if given the chance, opportunistically defraud the
trusting investor.1°7
Opponents of law and economics do not dispute the economic ef-
fects of securities regulation but argue that such effects must be taken
into account only to the extent they are consistent with the basic
theoretical framework-that securities regulation is designed to serve
social purposes and the violation of such regulations has dramatic
social consequences. 18 This position goes further, however, and ar-
gues that regulation not only produces social consequences, but also
104. While cognitive costs may be explained and examined by behavioralists, no real at-
tempt is made to incorporate these costs into a useful paradigm for evaluating legal behavior.
Law and economics, for example, addresses and incorporates transaction costs when analyzing
an individual's contracting behavior. In the same way, behavioralists should address to what
extent cognitive costs can be transacted around or bargained away. In the case of sophisticated
corporate entities, cognitive costs are transacted around simply by the shear number of people
working on a specific transaction. For example, in AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d
174 (3d Cir. 2003), AES did not send one employee to negotiate the deal with Dow Chemical
but sent many and retained outside representation, and thus drastically limited the cognitive
costs that could potentially impede the value of the exchange. While observations on human
behavior may be interesting, "[s]cholars will come to recognize that merely identifying how a
cognitive error might play out in a legal context is not sufficient to support a change in law or
policy." Rachlinski, supra note 97, at 1225.
105. Welle, supra note 16, at 524.
106. Id. at 541.
107. The "trusting investor" is a term employed by some scholars as the counterpart to the
law and economics theory's rational investor, or the "rational expectations investor." See Stout,
supra note 83, at 415-20.
108. Welle, supra note 16, at 542.
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has a socializing and educational function that is destroyed by the
pursuit of economic efficiency. 10 9
Opponents depart from the law and economics contractarian in
two additional positions. First, they challenge the "unrealistic model
of contract formation where all transactions are negotiated by sophis-
ticated, fully-informed parties of equal bargaining power, capable of
protecting their own self interests and of arriving at mutually benefi-
cial agreements that will maximize utility for both parties." 110 Second,
they prefer legal standards over rules, arguing that "[s]tandards allow
decisionmakers to take into account the totality of the circumstances,
to adapt to changing circumstances, and to treat like cases alike.""'
Behavioralists and other opponents of law and economics chal-
lenge the law and economics model as unrealistic and based on faulty
underlying assumptions."' First, individual investors have little power
to change the individual terms of a stock purchase because the deal is
often presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis., The assumption of
rationality, and the underlying implicit assumption that individuals
are capable of maximizing their utility, does not account for dispari-
ties in bargaining power that place the investor in a difficult position
for negotiating favorable terms. Additionally, investors may be un-
able to assess the risk associated with an investment, may not under-
stand the importance of specific terms, and may fall prey to various
other errors in a judgment." 4 Securities laws, therefore, should not be
based on a model which assumes perfect rationality, because such a
model fails adequately to protect the investor who is in an unequal
bargaining position, and is in many cases incapable of overcoming
behavioral hurdles that impede the ability to maximize individual
utility.
A central ideal of the law and economics movement is that spe-
cific legal rules will produce efficient outcomes because the conse-
quences and possible interpretations of specific actions are clearly
defined and easily predictable.," Opponents argue that "rules pro-
duce errors of under-inclusiveness that can result in guilty behavior
109. Id. at 541 ("The securities laws set standards that serve to socialize, to educate, and to
direct individuals toward more morally appropriate forms of behavior.").
110. Id. at 576.
111. Id. at 557.
112. Id. at 576.
113. Id. at 578.
114. Prentice, supra note 5, at 358-78.
115. See infra Part II.C.
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escaping sanctions, produce unequal treatment in similar cases, pro-
vide opportunities to evade prosecution, and conceal bias."'1 6 Al-
though bright-line legal rules will arguably produce efficient
outcomes, the critic is left with one nagging question: "What about
justice?" 7 The underlying theme of the rejection of the law and eco-
nomics position is the pursuit of social justice." 8 Articulating precise
rules will allow sophisticated parties to manipulate individual inves-
tors, while employing standards allows courts to proceed on a case-
by-case basis, reducing the chance that justice will be sacrificed by the
application of a bright-line rule.119
Opponents also argue that the fundamental purpose of securities
regulation is to protect the investor, thereby building confidence in
the markets.2 0 This argument is based on both the congressional in-
tent behind securities laws and the nature of the regulations promul-
gated thereby. At the heart of securities regulation is the pursuit of
full disclosure, allowing any investor to become fully informed about
a particular investment before an investment decision is made. Critics
point to disclosure provisions as providing support for the argument
that securities laws are primarily aimed at investor protection. 2' The
average investor, of course, is in no position to uncover material facts
through his own efforts, and must rely on the mandatory disclosure
requirements to acquire the information needed to make an informed
investment decision. The company and the investor are in inherently
unequal bargaining positions, and without requiring companies to
disclose everything the investor is vulnerable to manipulation and
fraud. Viewed in this way, "a fundamental purpose of the securities
laws is to protect those who cannot protect themselves.'
' 2
116. Welle, supra note 16, at 559.
117. Id. at 569. Yet, what this simple thought ignores is that justice has many different mean-
ings and many different contexts. While Welle would seem to equate justice with fairness, jus-
tice may also mean efficiency, especially within the context of legal procedures and rulemaking.
As Judge Posner observes, "[t]he demand for justice is not independent of its price." Posner,
supra note 74, at 778.
118. See POSNER, supra note 82, at 558 ("Some legal scholars are hostile to economic analy-
sis of law because they think it undermines legal rights by dissolving all issues into a cost-benefit
analysis.").
119. See Welle, supra note 16.
120. See generally Welle, supra note 16.
121. Id. Full disclosure, however, does not necessary support the behavioralist position or
the goal of investor protection. If, for example, investors cannot be trusted to make good deci-
sions even when armed with good information, disclosure may do more harm than good by
encouraging overconfidence. See Rachlinski, supra note 97, at 1177.
122. Welle, supra note 16, at 545.
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C. Rules Versus Standards
A choice between efficiency and social goals relates to the adop-
tion of rules or standards to achieve the desired outcome. Standards
allow judges to adopt flexible approaches to problems and to focus on
the specific factual circumstances of each individual case, 23 while
rules specifically define categorical outcomes based on a broad appli-
cation to a recurring factual scenario.'24 A standard inevitably re-
quires judges to consider and balance a number of relevant factors
before a decision is made, while a rule simply requires a judge to ap-
ply facts to the rule without a detailed inquiry into the context of each
case.1
25
A simple example will help identify the analytical and practical
distinctions between a rule and a standard.'26 The state legislature sets
the speed limit on interstate highways at seventy miles per hour, and
any driver exceeding this set speed has violated the law. The clear
rule governing the speed of automobiles on highways provides for an
easily predictable result-if you are driving over seventy miles per
hour, you know you are breaking the law. The state patrol has no
need to balance factors that may make a specific speed reasonable
123. It is important to note, however, that judges may not be applying the standards. Since
many times standards, especially complex standards, will involve multiple disputed issues of
fact, the case is not properly resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, in some
instances a lay jury will be applying the standard and this may, in turn, further decrease the
predictable application of the standard. Whether the fact that the lay juries give content to
standards, whereas judges and lawyers give content to rules, makes standards more accessible to
individuals is a disputed question that is not addressed here. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 598-99 (1992).
124. Id. at 561-62 ("One can think of the choice between rules and standards as involving
the extent to which a given aspect of a legal command should be resolved in advance or left to
an enforcement authority to consider.").
125. An important distinction to make is the extent to which the following analysis applies
to commands promulgated as rules or standards. Within the context of Section 29(a) and the
issue of reasonable reliance, the command is not promulgated by a legislature or agency.
Rather, the rule is developed under a line of precedent, framed as a rule applicable to all cases
that implicate the terms of the rule. Judge Posner, for example, notes that "an accumulation of
precedents dealing with the same question may create a rule of law having the same force as an
explicit statutory rule." POSNER, supra note 82, at 553. For example, this Note argues for a rule
precluding sophisticated parties from claiming reliance on any representations outside the final
written agreement. Such a rule will be applied when interpreting legal claims under other rules,
namely Rule lOb-5. When laws are promulgated as standards, or a hybrid rule-standard such as
the required analysis for a violation of 10b-5, "predictability will be enhanced by precedent to
the extent precedent transforms standards into rules." Kaplow, supra note 123, at 611. Likewise,
the interpretation of vague statutory commands by judicial bodies provides specific legal rules.
Judge Posner observed that "even in statutory fields, many of the specific rules of legal obliga-
tion are judicial glosses on broad statutory language." POSNER, supra note 82, at 553.
126. This example is based on an example used in Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974).
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because the legislature determined that any speed in excess of seventy
miles per hour is per se unreasonable.
If the legislature instead drafted a law that made it illegal to drive
at "unreasonable speeds," the application of this standard to individ-
ual drivers would be unclear. The state patrol officer would need to
make initial determinations concerning the reasonableness of the
driver's speed based on the weather conditions, traffic congestion,
lighting conditions, and various other factors. Following this initial
determination, the driver may challenge the officer's conclusions and
argue to the court that the speed was in fact reasonable and that the
officer's conclusion was erroneous.
As the above example illustrates, "[t]he difference between a
rule and a standard is a matter of degree-the degree of precision." '27
Both the rule and the standard may potentially prohibit the same
conduct. Based on the rule, driving seventy-one miles per hour results
in a law violation, and, based on the standard, seventy-one miles per
hour may be an unreasonable speed but it may not. The key differ-
ence between the rule and the standard, therefore, is the degree of
specificity. Under the rule, a driver traveling at seventy-one miles per
hour knows he is not driving at a reasonable speed, while the stan-
dard would require the driver to consult a number of factors before
determining whether or not seventy-one miles per hour is a reason-
able speed based on the then existing conditions.
Employing standards increases transaction costs in two ways: by
requiring actors to make ex ante decisions regarding the possible vari-
ant applications of the standard to particular conduct, and by requir-
ing a review of that determination by a judicial body and enforcement
body ex post.12 8 First, the driver must consult a number of factors to
determine the reasonable travel speed. Second, the enforcement body
must evaluate this determination based on their own view of what is
reasonable under the existing conditions. Finally, the judicial body
must review both the decision of the driver and the enforcement offi-
cial to determine whether the speed was in fact reasonable. By requir-
ing multiple evaluations of the reasonableness of particular conduct,
127. Id.
128. An additional transaction cost associated with either a rule or a standard is the promul-
gation cost. Formulating a rule entails a larger promulgation cost because the rulemaking body
must determine in advance much more than would be required under a standard. See Kaplow,
supra note 123, at 568-69. For the purposes of this Note, the analysis of promulgation costs is
excluded because the rule (or standard) at issue has already been promulgated and the only
issue is whether that command should be interpreted as a rule or standard.
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standards impose great transaction costs on both individual actors
and judicial bodies. The application of standards usually results in the
sacrificing of efficiency.
A rule would consider the activity lawful if the driver traveled at
a speed equal to or lesser than seventy miles per hour. The individual
can therefore avoid criminal sanction by following the rule and driv-
ing at the set reasonable speed. Under a standard, however, the
unlawful activity is ill-defined and the driver must not only avoid
traveling at a speed in excess of clearly defined unreasonable speeds,
but must also avoid "all other behavior that is within the penumbra of
the vague standard." 12 9 This result will force the individual, especially
a risk averse individual, to forgo valuable activity based on the uncer-
tainty of the standard.
The choice of a rule or standard will necessarily depend on the
underlying goal of regulating specific conduct. For example, a deter-
mination of whether the death penalty is appropriate in capital cases
requires consulting a number of case-specific factors, such as malice
and the nature of the crime. Society has deemed murder to have no
redeeming value, and therefore the vagueness of the standard does
not deter valuable conduct based on uncertainty. Likewise, society
recognizes that all murderers may not deserve the death penalty in all
cases and a per se rule requiring execution would run contrary to the
underlying social goals.
An analysis of contracting and bargaining behavior requires a
different focus. Under the criminal law, the choice of a rule or a stan-
dard is based on prohibiting specific conduct. The law of contracts,
however, focuses on parties bargaining for economic benefits or enti-
tlements. Criminal law and the law of contracts, therefore, serve two
fundamentally different purposes, and the application of rules or stan-
dards to individual conduct in the contract setting gives rise to a new
set of costs and benefits.
In the contract setting, establishing clear rules encourages the ef-
ficient allocation of benefits and risks. When the parties have a clear
view of the rules that govern the contract being executed, the possible
risks and benefits from the transaction can be easily allocated ex
ante.130 The ex post transaction costs are limited, because the rule es-
129. Ehrich & Posner, supra note 126, at 263.
130. See Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 73, at 510.
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tablishes how a judicial body will interpret the application of the rule
to this specific contract. A standard, however, would increase both
the ex ante and ex post transaction costs by requiring the parties to
gather information and deliberate on the possible judicial interpreta-
tions of the contract and litigate whether the parties' interpretation of
the contract was incorrect."' Both the risks and costs associated with
the bargain are increased by the standard, and efficiency is sacrificed
as a result.
In adopting the Exchange Act, Congress articulated a clear rule
prohibiting contractual waivers of compliance with the provisions of
the Act. The judicial interpretation of Section 29(a), however, makes
the application of the section dramatically less clear. As discussed in
Part I of this Note, AES transformed a rule-that an NRC precludes
a finding of reasonable reliance on representations made outside of
the final contract-into a standard. The effect of this transformation
is to increase the transaction costs associated with private contracting
behavior by creating uncertainty ex ante and by prolonging judicial
review and litigation ex post.13 2 As the next section will argue, estab-
lishing a clear rule that an NRC precludes a finding of reasonable
reliance as a matter of law will lower these transaction costs and pro-
duce efficient outcomes.
Rules will be cheaper for private parties to interpret when deciding upon their own
conduct and for adjudicators to apply to past behavior. Precisely because more has
been determined in advance, there will be less need for parties to conduct their own
studies and to predict legal outcomes and for adjudicators to devote effort to deter-
mine whether a violation should be deemed to have occurred.
Id.
131. Kaplow, supra note 123, at 569 ("Because a standard requires a prediction of how an
enforcement authority will decide questions that are already answered in the case of a rule,
advice about a standard is more costly.").
132. Also, note that changing a legal command from a rule to a standard may be more costly
than changing a standard into a rule. The primary function of a rule is to aid in the accurate
prediction of the application of a legal command. When courts transform what once was a clear
legal command into a complex or vague standard, the party loses the ability to conform behav-
ior to the command. This observation, however, does not suggest that rules cannot be changed
or altered following promulgation, but such changes may increase the costs associated with
rules. As Professor Kaplow explains:
It should be noted that making initial legal commands more rule-like does not imply
that they cannot be changed if new information becomes available. The prospect of
change does reduce the benefit of rules, but it does not follow that there will be no
benefit from providing guidance in the interim. Indeed, may detailed regimes that are
designed by regulatory agencies have a more rule-like character, with occasional revi-
sion, and detailed statutes, such as tax codes, are made more precise but often revised
later.
Kaplow, supra note 130, at 512. For the reduced benefit of rules due to the prospect of change,
see infra note 156.
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The behavioralists' abandonment of the rationality assumption
produces at least one important consequence in the context of rule-
making. If lawmakers assume that individuals will systematically be-
have irrationally, rules cannot be formulated to efficiently regulate
such behavior. For example, building on an earlier example, if the
state legislature desires to set the speed limit on state highways at a
reasonable speed, an initial determination must be made regarding
what specific speed would in fact be reasonable. According to behav-
ioralists, the legislature should assume that individuals will act irra-
tionally, falling prey to cognitive errors and poor judgment. For
example, setting the speed limit at seventy miles per hour assumes
that such a speed is reasonable and that drivers will in most cases not
exceed this set speed. If the legislature assumes rational behavior, the
speed limit will be followed in most instances because the benefit
gained from exceeding the speed limit is outweighed by the resulting
cost of paying the fine. Therefore, setting a clear rule, and the penalty
for violating the rule, will allow the state to efficiently regulate speeds
on their highway.
Assuming irrationality, however, confuses the issues and makes it
more difficult for lawmakers to develop clear rules to regulate human
conduct. The behavioralist assumes that individuals will be overconfi-
dent and overoptimistic, so the driver sees no need to obey the speed
limit because he will not get caught. Likewise, the fine imposed is
irrelevant to the irrational driver because he is unable to properly
calculate the probability of future events and will not be deterred by a
potential monetary fine. The only solution for the behavioralist is to
adopt a standard-based approach, restricting the driver's choice to
drive up to seventy miles per hour. The state legislature could pass a
law stating that individuals must drive at a reasonable speed, and the
state patrol officer, and ultimately a judicial body, will evaluate rea-
sonableness ex post. The driver is irrational and incapable of follow-
ing the set speed limit and must be regulated by the paternalistic
state.
This regulation, however, increases transaction costs in a number
of ways. First, the individual driver is assessed information costs be-
cause of the uncertainty as to what constitutes a reasonable speed.
Second, the state patrol officer is assessed increased enforcement
costs because the officer must now make an individual determination
regarding each vehicle's speed and can no longer rely on a rule that
predetermined reasonableness. Third, the judicial system will be as-
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sessed costs by litigants challenging the individual determinations.
These costs result from a standard that is incapable of efficiently
regulating human conduct. In other words, assuming irrationality
makes adopting a rule impossible.
III. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF SECURITIES FRAUD
Section 29(a) provides a clear rule that parties to a contract are
prohibited from opting out of regulation and waiving compliance with
the provisions of the Act.133 What constitutes "opting out" and waiv-
ing compliance, however, has been subjected to a confused interpre-
tation by courts and legal scholars. The critical issue under Section
29(a) is whether the use of an NRC or similar provision constitutes a
prohibited waiver of compliance or provides a mechanism for con-
tracting parties to efficiently allocate risks and liabilities associated
with the underlying transaction. The previous section discussed the
practical and analytical distinctions between a rule and a standard,
and drew on simple examples to illustrate the benefits of each. In the
contract setting, however, the discussion of rules and standards takes
on an additional importance.
A. The Assumptions Driving Rulemaking: The Superiority of Ration-
ality
The assumptions driving the promulgation and application of
rules and standards must be addressed before determining whether a
rule or a standard is preferable within the context of Section 29(a)
and the NRC. Law and economics scholars point to efficiency as the
main criterion, arguing that individuals will rationally seek to maxi-
mize their utility.134 Behavioralists assume irrationality, arguing that
investors will succumb to flaws in judgment and cognitive illusions,
and that policy formulation and rulemaking should take account of
such irrationality. 135
Behavioralists point to a number of tendencies that undermine
the assumption of rationality.13 6 Such tendencies are supported by
empirical evidence that, behavioralists contend, demonstrates pre-
dictable and consistent reactions to a particular environment or set of
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc. (2000); see also supra note 19.
134. See supra Part II.A.
135. See supra Part ll.B.
136. Id.
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circumstances. 137 The usefulness of such empirical evidence is highly
disputed, 138 however, and the true efficacy of behavioral observations
as a source of rules or standards remains in doubt.
139
Much of behavioralist analysis is premised on the observation
that investors do not read contracts, do not understand contracts, and
overemphasize the reliability of oral disclosures. 140 Even if such an
observation is true, as it clearly is in certain circumstances, its validity
in the context of securities regulation must be tested against the typi-
cal form of contracting for the purchase and sale of securities. A key
deficiency in the behavioralist argument, in this regard, is the un-
founded assumption that all contracts are form contracts with unne-
gotiated terms and conditions. 141 Based on an assumed form contract,
the behavioralist is confident in making the conclusion that "[tihe
verbal and legal obscurity of preprinted terms renders the cost of
searching out and deliberating terms exceptionally high. ' ' 142 For the
behavioralist argument to carry any weight, the contract in question
must be a form contract and the individual investor must neither read
nor understand the terms of such a contract.
Throughout his article, Professor Prentice assumes that the NRC
is contained in a form contract that the investor will neither read nor
understand. Yet, contracts between sophisticated parties ordinarily
entail negotiated agreements, whereby long, complex, and intense
negotiations are reduced to writing in a final agreement. Even though
form contracts would rarely be used in such a transaction, Prentice
extends his analysis to include sophisticated parties because "the in-
vesting decisions are made by all-too-human beings' 1 43 who "can be
trusting and vulnerable to deception." 144
Prentice, therefore, challenges the assumption of rationality even
within the context of sophisticated corporate actors. Yet, in the cor-
porate context, the assumption of rationality is necessary to execute
efficient exchanges. While the observation that individual investors
may succumb to errors in judgment and behavioral hurdles make the
assumption of rationality not entirely accurate in some circumstances,
137. Id.
138. See Mitchell, supra note 98, at 72.
139. Id.
140. See supra Part Il.B.
141. Prentice, supra note 5.
142. Id. at 362.
143. Id. at 378.
144. Id. at 418.
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the argument fails when applied to sophisticated corporate actors.
Corporations have boards of directors, independent committees,
CEOs, consultants, and teams of counselors and attorneys.14 To ar-
gue that a court cannot assume that such a conglomeration is ration-
ally acting in its self-interest is to argue that rationality is impossible
to assume under any conditions. Clearly this is not the case, and if it
were the case, the law of contracts would lose much of its force.
In AES, the parties to the transaction entered into negotiations
with the goal of aligning incentives and reaching a mutually beneficial
agreement. An assumption of rationality by the court would have
allowed it to determine the appropriate amount of deference that
ought to be given to AES's consent to the NRC. Clearly, AES en-
gaged in the negotiations to maximize their utility, and, likewise, were
perfectly capable of achieving this result. Using an assumption of ra-
tionality to analyze specific conduct does not require an assumption
that individuals will always maximize their utility. AES did not fall
prey to cognitive illusions that would support assuming irrationality,
because the entire organization, and presumably its attorneys, negoti-
ated and consented to the final agreement-NRC and all. Although
the end result disappointed AES, there were no behavioral obstacles
that prevented AES from insisting on including all representations in
the final agreement and, quite clearly, they should have done so. 146
Although the behavioralist may point to a number of explanations as
to why AES committed such an error, no gain is derived from the
court compensating for AES's lack of foresight and prolonging litiga-
tion where the ultimate result is clear. 147 The Third Circuit should
have assumed that all parties to the transaction acted rationally, and
in so acting consented to the terms of the contract and the representa-
tions contained therein, voluntarily distributing the benefits, risks,
and liabilities accordingly.
145. This capacity to delegate gives actors the ability to eliminate, or at least minimize,
cognitive errors. See supra note 104.
146. And surely AES will do so next time. Part of the value of rules is that they allow actors
to learn from their mistakes and conform their behavior to the rule in the future. If the Third
Circuit did not allow AES to escape the NRC, the company would insist that all representations
be included in the final written agreement in future transactions. Because of the Third Circuit's
decision, however, AES may be able to get more than they bargained for in future transactions
by not disclosing the representations on which they are in fact relying.
147. AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
805 (2003) ("While AES may have an uphill battle here and summary judgment for the defen-
dants may be appropriate at some point, we decline to give controlling significance to the exis-
tence of a non-reliance clause in a vacuum.").
[Vol 79:803
THE LA W AND ECONOMICS OF SECURITIES FRA UD
B. Preferring Rules over Standards
The behavioralist's emphasis on standards seeks to promote a
more flexible approach to judicial decisionmaking than bright-line
rules can provide. 148 Under Section 29(a), therefore, the behavioralist
argues that contractual provisions seeking to limit liability or allocate
risks must be interpreted under a flexible standard that is mindful of
the underlying policy rationale for the section.
149
Proponents of standards, especially within the context of securi-
ties regulation, emphasize the underlying goal of investor protection
as a basis for their critique. Professor Elaine Welle, for example, ar-
gues that rules permit undesirable conduct to escape punishment,
prevent equal treatment, encourage evasion, mask bias, and do not
necessarily result in greater efficiency and certainty. Professor Welle
argues that complex standard-based inquiries may result in greater
certainty and efficiency than bright-light rules could produce. 150
The primary difficultly in using a flexible standard to interpret
violations of Section 29(a) is that contracting parties will be unable to
assess the probability that a specific contractual provision will be en-
forceable and will be incapable of predicting how a court will inter-
pret the parties' rights and obligations under the contract. The
standard approach is predicated on a broad inquiry into the overall
fairness of the transaction and the fidelity of the contract to the social
principles underlying the regulation of securities, leaving the parties
with both an incomplete contract and an uncertain understanding of
how the contract will be interpreted in a court of law.'51 The resulting
transaction will, therefore, be inefficient because the transaction costs
associated with developing a contract that is mutually beneficial and
predictably enforceable will impair the contracting parties' ability to
rely on the performance of the obligations embodied in the agree-
ment.
148. See Welle, supra note 16, at 559 ("Because a rule, by definition, constitutes an abstrac-
tion, it captures the background principles and policies incompletely, and therefore produces
errors of under- and over-inclusiveness.").
149. Id. at 557.
150. Id. at 567-68. As the sole example to illustrate this point, Professor Welle uses the
example of the flexible investment contract test used to define what constitutes a security. Id.
Within the context of this Note, the investment contract test is irrelevant because Welle uses the
example to counter deregulation proposals and applies the analysis primarily to unsophisticated
investors ("bright-line tests would catch unsophisticated investors and practitioners by surprise
and create a bonanza for fraudulent promoters"). Id. at 568. Nevertheless, her analysis fails to




In AES, the court held that the inclusion of an NRC in a contract
will serve as an additional factor to determine the issue of reasonable
reliance.5 2 Specifically, the court observed that an NRC "may estab-
lish an absence of reliance and, when unrebutted, may even provide a
basis for summary judgment in the defendant's favor."'1 The problem
with the court's approach, however, is that the selling party, in this
case Dow Chemical, will not have a clear understanding of how a
court will ultimately interpret the contract. AES agreed to a negoti-
ated agreement that provided that they were solely relying on specific
representations, yet argued after the fact that they relied on alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations made during the course of the sale. In
effect, AES said, "'I lied when I told you I wasn't relying on your
prior statements' and then sought damages for their contents."' 54 The
Third Circuit, in allowing AES to get away with such a position, is
dramatically impairing a party's ability to rely on the performance of
obligations embodied in a contract.
The use of standards to interpret the enforceability of contracts is
fundamentally inconsistent with the basic purpose and operation of
contracts. Although courts invoke equitable principles to void con-
tracts based on public policy grounds, the benefit of a contract is to
produce a common understanding of the parties' rights and obliga-
tions, the expected performance, and the possible liability for breach.
If the parties cannot rely on the courts to enforce the contract as
drafted, the contract loses much of its viability as a commercial in-
strument.'55
Using clear rules to adjudicate contractual disputes provides par-
ties with the capability to predict how a court will interpret their un-
derlying rights and obligations. 15 6 Contracts for the purchase or sale of
152. AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 183.
153. Id. at 180.
154. Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 2000).
155. See POSNER, supra note 82.
156. The ability to predict how a court will interpret the contract may be undermined if
judges are unwilling to apply the rule, and therefore create exceptions, manipulate facts, and
distinguish cases. See Welle, supra note 16, at 570. It is doubtful, however, based the analysis of
a majority of the cases addressing the issue, that judges would find the application of a rule
enforcing an NRC against sophisticated parties to be so morally repugnant that they would feel
compelled to try and escape its application. Additionally, if a law is susceptible to change (such
as the susceptibility represented by the current circuit split regarding the proper interpretation
of an NRC and Section 29(a)) any articulated rule may lose some of its value by the resulting
uncertainty. As Professor Kaplow notes, "[tihe more room there is for argument about changed
conditions, the more such argument will be offered, at greater cost and with less certainty in
guiding behavior." Kaplow, supra note 123, at 617. Judge Posner agrees that the pressure for
change can undermine the predictability of rules: "Rules create pressure for exceptions, and the
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securities are inherently speculative,157 in that neither party has per-
fect information regarding the possible future contingencies that may
affect the value of the transaction, resulting in a need for clear rules
that dictate the parties' rights and obligations after the contract is
executed. 158 Without clear rules, contracting to buy or sell securities
would be incredibly costly, because parties would be unable or unwill-
ing to accept the risk that a court will strike down the agreement by
employing a broad unpredictable standard. 59
Section 29(a) provides a clear rule on which parties should be
able to rely when drafting contracts. 6° As long as the party is not
seeking to "opt out" of regulation, or binding the other party to waive
their rights under the Act, Section 29(a) has not been violated. The
use of an NRC, however, confuses courts because such provisions do
not technically waive compliance or the rights afforded by the Act,
but they do limit the parties' ability to bring valid future causes of
action. To formulate a rule applicable to NRCs, the courts must look
to the general rationale embodied in Section 29(a) and conclude that
an NRC is a necessary provision that efficiently allocates risks and
liabilities between the contracting parties.
The Third Circuit's analysis in AES demonstrates the confused
judicial interpretation of Section 29(a) and the NRC. The court first
noted that NRCs "reflect the fact that the seller was unwilling to
vouch for the accuracy of the information it was providing and the
fact that the buyer was willing to undertake to verify the accuracy of
that data for itself. ' 161 This holding reflects the proper understanding
of an NRC by recognizing that Dow Chemical did not accept liability
for (or "vouch" for, as the court puts it) any representations outside
the final agreement, and AES accepted this lack of liability and un-
dertook to verify any representations on which they sought to rely.
combination of a rule and its exceptions may be little different in practical terms from a stan-
dard, especially if ad hoc exceptions are allowed to multiply in order to improve the fit between
a rigid rule and a changing social context." POSNER, supra note 82, at 557.
157. This conclusion is based on the simple notion that future prices of securities cannot be
guaranteed, and any investment in a stock will involve risk and uncertainty of profit.
158. See George G. Triantis, Unforeseen Contingencies: Risk Allocation in Contracts, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 73, at 100.
159. See Masten, supra note 87, at 26 ("Without some form of assurance that others will,
when the time comes, uphold their end of the bargain, individuals will be justifiably reluctant to
make investments, forego opportunities, or take other actions necessary to realize the full value
of the exchange.").
160. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2000).




The court continued, "[c]learly, in such circumstances, a buyer who
relies on seller-provided information without seeking to verify it has
not acted reasonably. ' 162 In other words, the court concluded that
AES could not prove reasonable reliance and, therefore, had no vi-
able lOb-5 action.
In spite of this analysis, the court concluded that, "[w]e are un-
willing.., to hold that the extraction of a non-reliance clause, even
from a sophisticated buyer, will always provide immunity from Rule
10b-5 fraud liability. ' ' 163 Yet, in the same paragraph, the court noted
that a buyer who relies on information that is not included in the final
agreement, and information for which the seller assumes no liability,
does not act reasonably in relying on such representations. This con-
fused logic yields that the very mechanism by which this conclusion is
possible, the NRC, violates Section 29(a) because it waives a right
that the buyer really does not have in the first place.
Before AES, courts articulated a clear rule applicable to the en-
forcement and validity of NRCs: a plaintiff could not claim reason-
able reliance on representations not included in the final written
agreement. 164 Such a rule is clearly founded in the law of contracts and
premised on the need to provide contracting parties with the capabil-
ity to reduce long-term and complex negotiations to a written agree-
ment. The rule puts both purchasers and sellers on notice that in
order to claim reliance on a representation made during the course of
negotiations, the representation must be reduced to writing. Such a
rule does not contradict a broad social policy or offend typical notions
of fairness or justice-it simply allows contracting parties to effi-
ciently allocate risks and liabilities in a contract, and to understand
the rights and obligations of both parties to a transaction.
In transforming the NRC into another factor in a complex bal-
ancing test, AES increases the transaction costs associated with enter-
ing into a contract. A party is now incapable of reducing long,
complex, and intense negotiations to a final written agreement that
serves as the entire bargain of the parties. This, in effect, allows pur-
chasing parties to say one thing, mean another, and dupe the selling
party into believing they are only relying on certain representations.
In such circumstances, the selling party is incapable of protecting
themselves from fraud claims because they cannot possibly know
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1996).
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every statement or fact that was disclosed during the due diligence
process. Adopting a rule providing that an NRC demonstrates con-
clusive proof of non-reliance in a contract between sophisticated par-
ties forces the purchasing party to disclose all the representations on
which they are in fact relying. This approach reduces fraud, and
claims for fraud, by producing a common understanding of the trans-
action. 65
The parties to the contact at issue in AES were all sophisticated
business entities, and the contract resulted from long and complex
negotiations and due diligence. Presumably, during this process AES
developed a working understanding of the important aspects of the
deal, and the representations that informed that understanding. Nev-
ertheless, AES sat down at the drafting table and signed a contract
that contained an NRC yet did not contain any representations on
which they were in fact relying. As in Harsco, "[h]ere there is a de-
tailed writing developed via negotiations among sophisticated busi-
ness entities and their advisors." 166 Despite this fact, the Third Circuit
permitted the "use of the defendant['s] prior representations.., to
defeat the clear words and purpose of the Final Agreement's integra-
tion clause," 167 and, in effect, made the contract not worth the paper
on which it was written.
C. Protecting the Investor and Reducing Fraud
The interpretation of Section 29(a) and an NRC must be based
on clear rules that assume the investor's ability to rationally maximize
individual utility. Without such rules, the transaction costs associated
with buying or selling securities will place a substantial burden on
issuers, individual investors, and the financial markets. A goal of effi-
ciency and an assumption of rationality do not undermine the Con-
gressional goals of investor protection. On the contrary, lowering
165. While the rule advocated throughout this Note may seem unduly harsh to plaintiffs,
even behavioralists may see the value in such an approach. If courts consistently let plaintiffs get
away with poor decisions, which may or may not be attributable to cognitive errors, the plaintiff
has no motivation to make better choices in the future (or no reason to). As Professor
Rachlinski notes, "[p]eople are also less likely to adopt better cognitive processes for making
decisions when they do not suffer all of the costs of erroneous choices directly." Rachlinski,
supra note 97, at 1222. Likewise, when an individual initially makes an error, suffering the
consequences for that error will make it more likely that the individual will correct their behav-
ior in the future. Ulen, supra note 85, at 795 ("Even if people make mistakes when they make
their first market choices, they have an opportunity to learn through repeated transactions.").
166. Harsco, 91 F.3d at 343.
167. One-O-One Enters., Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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transaction costs, producing clear rules, and providing mechanisms to
easily allocate risk and liability protect the investor and reduce fraud.
Such a rule would put both parties on notice that all representations
must be included in the final agreement, and if they are not, that the
parties cannot rely on or be liable for the omitted representations.
Fraud is decreased by forcing the parties to reduce their agreement to
writing, enforcing the agreement as written, and denying recovery to
plaintiffs who fail to follow the rules.
Using 29(a) to justify the use of a standard to determine reason-
able reliance presents an undesirable approach to the interpretation
of contracts for the purchase and sale of securities. Behavioralists and
other critics, however, argue that a multi-factor balancing produces
more fair and just results. With no factor being determinative, the
court is able to undertake a fact-specific analysis of the particular
transaction, taking into account each factor used to determine rea-
sonable reliance. The behavioralist is presumably satisfied with such
an approach because the court is able to assess the extent to which
cognitive errors inhibited the plaintiff's judgment, and address these
concerns in the ultimate determination of reasonable reliance. Such
inquiries, however, will typically involve questions of fact that are not
properly resolved on summary judgment. In effect, this allows plain-
tiffs to avoid summary judgment or a motion to dismiss by simply
claiming that they were duped or fell prey to a flawed behavioral in-
stinct.
While such a position may be valid within the context of a
fraudulent broker and trusting individual investor, the position loses
much of its force when applied to sophisticated corporate entities.
AES, for example, is a company that operates power plants in twenty-
seven countries, producing annual sales of over $8.4 billion. The com-
pany has over 30,000 employees, including forty-four officers and
nine directors.168 To argue that AES should be afforded the opportu-
nity to allege cognitive errors is to completely abandon concerns of
judicial economy and practical reality. AES can manage to profitably
run a large international business but its managers are incapable of
comprehending the significance of an NRC they signed on three sepa-
rate occasions? The question seems to answer itself.
168. See AES Corporation Corporate Overview, http://www.corporate-
ir.net/ireye/ir-site.zhtml?ticker=AES&script=2100 (last visited Apr. 10, 2004); AES Corpora-
tion Officers and Directors, http://www.corporate-ir.net/ireye/ir_site.zhtml?
ticker=AES&script=2200 (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
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The efficient outcome is reached by transforming the standard
into a rule that prohibits sophisticated investors from claiming rea-
sonable reliance on any representations made outside of the final
written agreement. In fashioning this rule, the court assumes that so-
phisticated corporate investors enter into transactions to rationally
maximize utility and are therefore capable of aligning incentives, ac-
cepting risk, and binding themselves to specific liabilities. By assum-
ing rationality the court is able to apply a rule to all similar
transactions. The court's consistent application of the rule will allow
parties to easily predict the enforceability and legal effect of the con-
tractual provisions, and thereby allow parties to efficiently align in-
centives, distribute risk, and minimize transaction costs.
While such a rule may at first glance appear to favor the defen-
dant, the operation of the rule will protect buyers from contracts con-
taining NRCs with few or no actual representations. By requiring
buyers to explicitly state and agree to specific representations on
which they are relying, the buyer is protected, and therefore the seller
is liable, for the accuracy of such representations. Therefore, just as
the rule would foreclose a factually specific judicial review of reason-
able reliance when the plaintiff claims reliance on representations
made outside of the contract, reliance will be per se reasonable when
the representation is included in the final agreement.
Such a rule, while assuming rationality and valuing efficiency,
serves the congressional goal of investor protection. While sophisti-
cated corporate actors will not necessarily "behave in a selfless fash-
ion"169 and volunteer liability for any and all representations, a
sophisticated buyer can rightfully insist that all representations on
which it is relying are included in the final contract-protecting the
investor from fraud as to those specific representations.
The primary advantage of enforcing clearly defined rules based
on an assumption of rationality is that investors and issuers will be
able to easily predict the extent of their risk and the nature of their
liabilities associated with a particular transaction. The rule providing
that NRCs preclude a finding of reasonable reliance on anything out-
side of the contract as a matter of law, for example, provides the in-
vestor with the ability to bargain for the inclusion of specific
representations in the final agreement. The following example will
help illustrate the mechanics of such a transaction and the effect of
169. Welle, supra note 16, at 541.
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including an NRC in the final written agreement. S and P enter into a
transaction to exchange S stock for P assets. The current value of S
stock is $10 per share and the contract is for the exchange of 1000
shares of S for specific P assets. During the course of the negotiations,
S makes three oral representations to P concerning the future value
of S stock. In drafting the final agreement, P would disclose that he is
relying on all three representations in making the decision to execute
the transaction and should insist that all three representations be in-
cluded in the final written agreement. If S is willing to assume liability
for all three representations, each will be included in the final written
agreement, along with an NRC, and both P and S will have a clear
understanding of the underlying transaction and any subsequent dis-
putes or litigation can proceed on the basis of the final agreement. If
S, however, is unwilling to stand by all three representations, the two
parties must negotiate for the inclusion of each specific representa-
tion in the agreement. If P cannot in good faith agree to a transaction
without S assuming liability for representation one, for example, P
can walk away from the deal or negotiate a decrease in the purchase
price based on the increased amount of risk associated with S's re-
fusal to accept liability. On the other hand, if S agrees to include all
three representations in the agreement, the purchase price should be
increased based on the increased amount of risk and liability expo-
sure. These negotiations will produce an efficient result where each
party negotiated the specific representations on which reliance was
justified, risk and liability were allocated between the parties, and the
purchase price was adjusted accordingly.
The law and economics of securities fraud, therefore, is premised
on the application of a clear rule dictating the enforceability of NRCs,
the parties' recognition that reliance is reasonable only to the extent
that the party is relying on representations included in the final
agreement, and the parties' ability to allocate risk, liability, and bene-
fit between themselves. Such an analysis protects the investor from
needing to rely on oral representations, because if the investor is in
fact relying on an oral statement, he can justifiably insist that the rep-
resentation be included in the final agreement. The outcome will be
efficient because both parties understand the nature of the risk and
liabilities assumed with a clear picture of the representations forming
the basis for the agreement.
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D. Section 29(a) and the Non-Reliance Clause: Why AES Corp. v.
Dow Chemical Co. is Wrong
In AES, the Third Circuit misinterpreted Section 29(a) and mis-
construed that nature and effect of an NRC. In reaching its holding,
the Third Circuit stated that:
[Section29(a)] is designed to protect rights created by the Exchange
Act, and it expressly forecloses contracting parties from defining
the boundaries of their transaction in a way that relieves a party of
the duties imposed by that Act. We do not dispute that there may
be economic efficiency in allowing private parties the freedom to
fashion their own bargains. But Congress has made a decision to
limit that freedom when it comes to anticipatory waivers of Ex-
change Act claims. Accordingly, we conclude that we must side
with the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogen rather than with
the Harsco court.170
This reasoning aptly demonstrates the misunderstanding by both
courts and legal scholars regarding the purpose and effect of an NRC,
and the extent to which Section 29(a) applies to such clauses. The
primary confusion is based on what constitutes an "anticipatory wav-
ier" and the specific effect of an NRC.
Throughout this Note, I argued for the adoption of a rule enforc-
ing NRCs against sophisticated parties in contracts negotiated at
arm's length. The discussions of rationality, rules versus standards,
and investor protection all advance the reasons as to why such a rule
is preferable to a standard based on an assumption of irrationality.
The issue remains open, to an extent, as to how such a rule can escape
the prohibition of Section 29(a). While much of the answer is con-
tained throughout the course of my argument, that argument is con-
densed and repeated here for reinforcement.
Section 29(a) prohibits parties, whether voluntary or not, from
waiving their rights under the Act. Therefore, a contractual clause
seeking to limit the rights of a party, or that party's right to recover
for potential claims, is void and unenforceable. Cases interpreting the
use of an NRC, while not explicating the effect of Section 29(a), hold
that a sophisticated (and in most cases unsophisticated) party does
not have the right to rely on oral communications or written repre-
sentations that are not contained in the final written agreement. This
is so because that party cannot claim that any reliance on those repre-
sentations was reasonable. The party, lacking the ability to claim rea-
170. AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 183 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks and alterations in original omitted), cert. denied, 174 S. Ct. 805 (2003).
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sonable reliance, does not have the right to rely on those representa-
tions. A clause explicitly acknowledging that the party has no right to
rely on representations made outside of the final written agreement,
therefore, does not waive a right or the potential for recovery. Since
no right to rely exists, the NRC does not waive a right and therefore
does not violate Section 29(a).
CONCLUSION
The interpretation of Section 29(a) and an NRC raises funda-
mental questions concerning the purposes of securities regulation and
the nature of legal rulemaking. The debate among courts and scholars
demonstrates the complex and competing rationales for regulating
the securities industry, and the discussion between the behavioralists
and law and economic scholars demonstrates the disagreement as to
what concerns should drive legal rulemaking.
The NRC results in efficient contracting by allowing individual
parties to freely negotiate and allocate risk and liabilities. The NRC is
not a waiver of compliance as prohibited by Section 29(a) because a
party is still able to bring a fraud action based on the representations
contained in the final written agreement and, in most cases, does not
have the right to rely on representations made outside of the final
contract. The clause provides contracting parties with the ability to
clearly define the boundaries of their transaction, proceed on a com-
mon understanding of their resulting rights and obligations, and pro-
duce efficient outcomes.
The law and economics of securities fraud is based on the under-
standing that through clear rules requiring representations to be con-
tained in a final written agreement, parties will be able to reduce
fraud by negotiating for the terms on which each party may rely. By
negotiating for the representations, the parties will allocate risk and
liabilities between themselves based on the representations included,
and the purchase price will be adjusted accordingly. The NRC, there-
fore, creates an efficient outcome and prevents a party from being
defrauded by requiring all representations to be included in writing.
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